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Journal of International Dispute Settlement, (2011), pp. 1–29
Arbitration in Autumn†
WILLIAM W. PARK*
Often invoked as a metaphor for decline and decay, autumn also carries a sense of
robust maturity bringing fruitful harvest and new beginnings. The season’s double
symbolism evokes rival visions of arbitration today. Some observers see a golden
age of cheap and cheerful proceedings as replaced by a costly complexity that fails
arbitration’s promise of coherent and efficient dispute resolution. On closer
scrutiny, however, arbitration reveals itself as having arrived at its autumn not in
the sense of decay, but rather with vital maturity. Productive exchanges among the
various stakeholders in the process serve to refine the counterpoise among
accuracy, fairness and efficiency. Although any forecast remains tentative, most
signs suggest that arbitration will continue to play a key role in promoting sound
economic cooperation.
Season of mists and mellow fruitfulness,
close bosom-friend of the maturing sun,
conspiring with him to load and bless,
with fruit the vines that round the thatch-eves run.
John Keats, Ode to Autumn (1819)1
1. Introduction: the Two Faces of Autumn
Tucked between summer and winter, autumn gives us days that grow shorter,
flowers that fade and leaves that fall from the trees. Often invoked as a symbol
for decline and decay, the season possesses its share of melancholy tones.
Autumn carries positive connotations as well. A sense of robust maturity
infuses a season of mellow fruitfulness when apples turn red, orchards fill with
fruit, grain ripens and pumpkins present themselves for picking. In many
places, the season triggers a new academic year for students and teachers.
This dual metaphor carries into the field of arbitration, that chameleon-like
process by which litigants renounce otherwise competent courts in favour
of private and binding dispute resolution. According to some observers,
* Professor of Law, Boston University. President, London Court of International Arbitration. General Editor,
Arbitration International.
†Adapted from the Opening Lecture, Geneva Master in International Dispute Settlement, 29 September
2010. Copyright � 2011, William W. Park.
1 Composed as Keats walked along the River Itchen in southern England, the poem has been read as both a
personification of autumn’s bounty and a meditation on the poet’s impending death.
� The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
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arbitration has fallen into an autumn of decline and decay, shedding leaves of
efficiency and coherence to reveal barren branches of rules without reason.
Recent literature laments that a golden age of cheap and cheerful arbitration
has yielded to backlash against a system marked by too many rules, excessive
costs and undue delay.2 One group of critics has published a manifesto
condemning arbitration for its negative effect on human development and
environmental sustainability.3
On closer scrutiny, however, international arbitration reveals itself as having
arrived at its autumn with fruitful maturity, not decay or decline. The harvest
of a more refined arbitral process derives from productive exchanges among
arbitrators, judges, scholars, legislators, counsel and professional associations,
all of whom find their place among arbitration’s stakeholders.4
The very volume of debate about arbitration during the past decade testifies
to robust growth rather than to decline. Geneva’s great criminal lawyer, the late
Dominique Poncet, used to say, ‘On sert bien la justice en la critiquant’.5 In contrast,
decay and death normally announce themselves by silence rather than debate.6
Testing this thesis, of course, calls for consideration of the context in which
litigants choose arbitration. Not surprisingly, motives vary according to the type
of dispute. For international transactions, arbitration justifies itself as a path to
more level procedural playing fields,7 which in turn boost predictability in
2 See eg Michael Waibel and others (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality
(Kluwer 2010) 189.
3 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime (2010) available online at: <http://www.osgoode
.yorku.ca/public_statement/> accessed 31 May 2011, which expressed concern regarding the ability of
governments to act for their people in response to the concerns of human development and environmental
sustainability because the current investment treaty arbitration process ‘is not a fair, independent, and balanced
method for the resolution of investment disputes’. Michael McIlwrath commented on a recent survey sponsored
by PricewaterhouseCoopers on corporate attitudes and practices on international arbitration. Michael McIlwrath,
‘Ignoring the Elephant in the Room: International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2008’ (2008) 2
World Arb Med Rev 111. McIlwrath notes that 56% of the interviewees who tried to enforce their awards did not
recover the full value. He suggests that more thought should be given to ways one might enhance corporate
counsel preference for international arbitration.
4 This positive comparison holds true not only in arbitration’s traditional commercial stomping grounds, but
also in newer frontiers such as finance, taxation, sports and foreign asset protection. For example, the OECD has
published a Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, most recently updated in 2010. See generally,
William W. Park and David R. Tillinghast, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration (Sdu Fiscal & Financial Publishers
2004).
5 ‘We advance justice by our critiques.’ An illustration of how honest debate fosters improvement can be
found in the reaction of Korean Air Lines to a disaster in Guam in 1997. An investigation revealed that one of
the contributing factors was a culture among pilots of speaking obliquely rather than directly. A junior officer
might say to his senior, ‘Sir, it’s raining,’ rather than ‘Put on the weather radar right now!’ To its credit, the
airline took corrective action, requiring English in the cockpit to reduce the sometimes ambiguous verbal
formulae used in Korean as a matter of courtesy. See Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers (2008) 213–23.
6 Such critical debate, of course, in no way diminishes the achievements of or the deference owed to the
pioneering grand old men (as they all were back then) who built international arbitration on a line that ran from
London to Geneva stopping in Paris, with occasional detours to places like Stockholm and Zürich. Indeed, their
contributions play a vital part in the maturing of international dispute resolution,
7 In an intractably heterogeneous world, lacking effective supra-national courts with general jurisdiction,
arbitration promotes respect for shared ex ante expectations. The search for political and procedural neutrality
finds special application in claims for discriminatory expropriation brought pursuant to investment treaties. In
safeguarding property rights against unjust deprivation, arbitration also promotes public welfare and human
rights, constituting a key element in the rule of law and facilitating creation of what Australian jurist Julius Stone
Journal of International Dispute Settlement2
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finding facts and applying law.8 In construction and insurance, the goal might
be expertise. In the United States, arbitration often serves to remove consumer
and employment disputes from the perceived vagaries of civil juries.9 With this
caveat, let us turn to the maturing of arbitration through norms chosen to
guide proceedings.
2. From Hard Law to Soft Law
For better or for worse, legal discourse sometimes distinguishes between ‘hard
law’ and ‘soft law’ norms. In the realm of arbitration, the former looks at the
process from the outside: the perspective of judges and legislators charged with
providing a framework of statutes, treaties and cases setting the contours for
judicial recognition of arbitration agreements and awards. By contrast ‘soft law’
addresses arbitration as seen from the inside: the procedural and professional
standards used in finding facts or ascertaining applicable law. The Federal
Arbitration Act would exemplify the former, while the International Bar
Association Rules on Taking Evidence might illustrate the latter.
During the past half century, the arbitration community shifted much of its
attention from the statutes and treaties, which permit modern arbitration to
exist, towards the soft law guidelines that aim to balance fairness and
efficiency.10 The hard law phase began in earnest in 1958 with adoption of the
New York Arbitration Convention,11 which aimed to create mechanisms to
promote arbitration’s international currency by making awards transportable
from one country to another. That treaty was followed in short order by the
ICSID Convention,12 serving to remove non-commercial impediments to the
free cross-border flow of private investment, and the Panama Convention,13
intended to facilitate arbitration implicating Latin America.
called ‘enclaves of justice’. Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (Stanford University Press 1965). See
also Jan Paulsson, ‘Enclaves of Justice’ Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt. (2007).
8 For present purposes, the notion of ‘law’ encompasses an authoritative dispute resolution process
including principles to guide general conduct as well as procedures for deciding cases, without the distinction
often imposed by francophone jurists between ‘loi’ (an enactment) and ‘droit’ (legitimate norms of a more general
character).
9 In some instances, arbitration may serve to create new agreements in otherwise politically charged
climates. See Jeff Jacoby, ‘Arbitration’s Intolerable Bind’ Boston Globe (12 January 2011) discussing arbitration to
fix salaries for municipal employees. Arbitration has also been used to resolve emotionally-charged wrongful
death claims (Blackwater Security Consulting v Nordan [2011] WL 237840, [2011] EDNC) and a questionable
process for settling sexual harassment claims (Nelson v Am. Apparel, Inc., [2008] WL 4713262, [2008] Cal Ct
App).
10 Interestingly, development of personal computer technology presents a similar pattern. In the early years
engineers focused on improved hardware: better screens and smaller hard drives. Today the emphasis has shifted
more to software, including internet search engines and debate on the relative merits of various operating
systems.
11 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted 10 June 1958,
entered into force 7 June 1959.
12 The ICSID Convention, opened for signature on 18 March 1965 and entered into force on 14 October
1966.
13 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 30 January 1975.
Arbitration in Autumn 3
JNLIDS Vol2 No2 Sept 2011 05636595.indd   5 10/8/11   08:10:43
Thereafter, national arbitration statutes were streamlined to enhance the
finality of awards through less intrusive judicial review. Significant reforms have
been adopted notably in England, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and
the 60 or so countries that enacted some variant of the UNCITRAL Model
Law.14
In comparison, during the past dozen years the arbitration community
turned its gaze towards guidelines for conduct of proceedings. The Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators has issued protocols on subjects ranging from
interviewing arbitrators to calculating interest. The International Bar
Association adopted standards on evidence and conflicts of interest. And the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) published its Techniques for
Controlling Time and Cost in Arbitration.15
In the United States, which has sometimes lagged behind the rest of
the world in sensitivity to arbitration’s complexities, the American Bar
Association in 2004 overhauled its Code of Ethics for arbitrators. Two
years later the College of Commercial Arbitrators issued a guide to ‘Best
Practices’,16 followed in 2008 by American Arbitration Association protocols
on ‘information exchange’ aimed at making document production more
efficient.17
Whatever might be the merits or drawbacks of the particular protocols, they
demonstrate a deep concern for doing things right. Increasingly these
guidelines enjoy the status of para-regulatory texts pressed into service for
filling gaps in national law.18
3. The Three Musketeers of Arbitral Duty
A. Accuracy, Fairness and Efficiency
Articulating the contours of arbitral duty remains anything but an easy task,
with or without the help of soft-law guidelines. The enormity of the mission
brings to mind a comment by the French General Charles de Gaulle, when a
14 See generally, William W. Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes (OUP 2006) 205–317.
15 ICC Publication No. 843 (2007). Adding to the fabric of soft law, the ICC has also published a selection
of procedural orders addressing matters such as organization of proceedings, witnesses and experts, hearings and
interim measures. See ICC Bulletin, 2010 Special Supplement, Decision on ICC Arbitration procedure
(2003–04) (ICC Pub No 728E, 2011).
16 The College of Commercial Arbitrators published a second edition in October 2010. The Swiss
Arbitration Association had published its own views on the matter in M Wirth (ed), Best Practices in International
Arbitration, ASA Bulletin Special Series No 26 (2006).
17 During the same period of time, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR)
issued multiple protocols on arbitral procedure, including recent guidelines on determining damages, adopted in
2010.
18 See Applied Industrial Materials Corp v Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS, 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir 2007),
affirming 2006 WL 1816383 (SDNY 2006). The District Court at notes 12 and 13 considered ethical standards
adopted in 2004 jointly by the American Bar Association and American Arbitration Association, as well as
guidelines of the International Bar Association adopted in 2004.
Journal of International Dispute Settlement4
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protester tried to interrupt by shouting, ‘Away with all idiots!’19 Without
missing a beat, the general repeated the taunt and then, gaze fixed directly on
the heckler, responded, ‘Un vaste programme, en effet,’ which would translate as
‘A formidable task, indeed.’ Likewise, attempts to circumscribe arbitral
obligations have tossed the best of minds upon the storm waves of inquiry,
as they seek to express through sequential grammar a reality that remains
stubbornly simultaneous.
As a starting point for discussion, one might suggest three principal
obligations of an arbitrator: accuracy, fairness and efficiency. These ‘Three
Musketeers’ of arbitral duty, however, often interact in anything but the
‘One-for-all’ spirit of the original heroes in the Alexandre Dumas novel.20
The first duty of an arbitrator lies in rendering an accurate award, in the
sense of fidelity to the text and the context of the relevant bargain,
whether memorialized in a private contract or the terms of a public investment
treaty. The arbitrator should aim to get as near as reasonably possible to
understanding what actually happened between the litigants, and how the
pertinent legal norms apply to the controverted events. The fact that
arbitral awards are not generally reviewable for simple mistakes of law or fact
in no way diminishes this obligation. Arbitration would provide poor justice
if arbitrators aspired to nothing higher than to meet the minimum grounds for
annulment.
The second duty relates to procedural fairness, a capacious notion that
incorporates several elements, notably (i) the responsibility to hear before
deciding;21 (ii) the obligation to respect the contours of arbitral jurisdiction22
and (iii) the observation of the general duty of impartiality and independ-
ence.23
The third obligation lies in an aspiration towards efficiency, to promote the
optimum administration of justice. To the extent possible, the good arbitrator
19 The original French is variously quoted as ‘A bas tous les imbéciles!’ or something even more discourteously
vulgar.
20 As recorded by Dumas, the musketeers lived by the motto ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous’ (All for one and one
for all). Alexandre Dumas, Les Trois Mousquetaires (1844).
21 Often called ‘due process’ or ‘natural’ justice in the Anglo-American legal world, and ‘principe du
contradictoire’ or ‘droit d’être entendu’ in francophone legal systems. Likewise, Germans sometimes refer to the
‘fair-trial principle’ (rechtsstaatliches Verfahren) or speak of a ‘hearing in accordance with law’ (Anspruch auf
rechtliches Gehör). In public international law, particularly investment disputes, due process inheres the notion of
‘denial of justice’ claims.
22 In the negative, the duty might be expressed as avoidance of decisions, which constitute an excess of
authority either under the contract or by reason of some public policy constraint imposed on subject matter
arbitrability or procedure.
23 Arbitrator bias, of course, presents tensions of its own. Critics of arbitration often talk as if bias remains a
problem unique to arbitrators. Yet in the real world, judges also fall prey to unacceptable predispositions. See eg
Notice and Order of George H Painter, Administrative Law Judge, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17
September 2010, reporting on a colleague who during nearly 20 years of service on the bench had never ruled in
favour of a claimant. See also, Michael Schroeder, ‘If You’ve got a Beef With a Futures Broker, This Judge Isn’t
for You’ The Wall Street Journal (Washington, 13 December 2000) A1.
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will seek to measure accuracy and fairness so as to arrive at a counterpoise that
reduces the prospect of undue cost and delay.24
A violation of the duties of accuracy and efficiency normally would not in
itself trigger intervention by a reviewing authority, whether it be a national
court or an ad hoc ICSID committee.25 The possibility that an arbitrator might
make a mistake, or be less than efficient, remains a risk assumed by both sides.
By contrast, violation of arbitration’s basic procedural fairness does and should
give rise to sanctions.26
The penalty for breach of an arbitrator’s duty of fairness carries a certain
irony, in that sanctions do not fall directly on the arbitrator who breached his
or her duty. Although they may suffer a loss of reputation, offending arbitrators
can benefit from immunity even for violations of basic procedural integrity.27
The price of misconduct thus falls most directly on the prevailing party, in the
form of award annulment for breach of procedural integrity.
B. An Enforceable Award: The Fourth Musketeer
Enthusiasts of The Three Musketeers will remember a fourth member of the
group, young d’Artagnan, who hoped to become one of the King’s guards
along with his friends Athos, Porthos and Aramis. Likewise, an additional duty
figures prominently in the catalogue of arbitral obligations.
To reduce the prospect that the arbitrator’s decision will remain nothing
more than a piece of paper, arbitrators are expected to exercise vigilance in
promoting an enforceable award. To the extent possible, and consistent with
their other duties, arbitrators should avoid giving cause for annulment or
non-recognition of the award by reviewing authorities.28
24 A 2010 study, by the Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group found that 100% of corporate
counsel think that arbitration takes too long, and 69% think that it costs too much. Lucy Reed, More on Corporate
Criticism of International Arbitration, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (2010) <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/>
accessed 30 May 2011 (blaming delays on the limited availability of top-tier arbitrators and their ‘excessive
concern for due process’). Another study, co-sponsored by a major law firm and a London university, suggested
that 50% of the participating respondents were dissatisfied with the performance of arbitrators in international
arbitration. See White & Case LLP & School of International Arbitration, 2010 International Arbitration Survey:
Choices in International Arbitration (Queen Mary, University of London 2010). The study follows an earlier survey
sponsored by PriceWaterhouseCooper in 2006.
25 Although grounds for annulment find different articulations from one system to another, most aim at
matters such as tribunal excess of powers, bias or departure from a fundamental rule of fair procedure. See eg
Federal Arbitration Act s 10; art 1520 of the French Code de procédure civile; art 52 of the ICSID Convention of
1965.
26 Such scrutiny of procedural fairness also serves to promote accuracy by encouraging arbitrators to listen to
both sides before deciding.
27 In one case, where a sole arbitrator failed to disclose his romantic relationship with the sister of
respondent’s counsel, immunity was upheld even though the award had been vacated. See La Serena Properties v
Weisbach, 186 Cal App 4th 893, 112 Cal Rptr 3d 597 (Cal Ct App 2010), in which claimants argued that the
arbitrator should be liable for fraudulently inducing them to approve his appointment in a case which essentially
denied the claim. The reviewing court found disclosure to be an integral part of the arbitral process, and thus
protected by common law immunity for quasi-judicial acts.
28 This duty of enforceability has been memorialized in institutional arbitration rules. Art 35 of the
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules provides, ‘In all matters not expressly provided for in
these Rules, the [ICC] Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every
Journal of International Dispute Settlement6
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In practice, an inherent rivalry often permeates the intersection of the
arbitrators’ various obligations. Too much efficiency may mean too little time
to hear evidence. Overly intricate procedural safeguards can paralyse
proceedings. In some cases, attempts to please a reviewing court can reduce
the arbitrator’s fidelity to the parties’ expectations.
4. The Challenge of Caribbean Niquel
A. The Right to Comment
To illustrate the complex interaction among arbitral duties, it would be hard to
find a better cautionary tale than the one supplied by a French court in
Caribbean Niquel v Overseas Mining.29 Emphasizing procedural fairness over
efficiency, the Paris Cour d’appel affirmed the parties’ right to comment on new
legal theories even at the addition of cost and delay.
After a Cuban mining joint venture had gone sour, arbitrators sitting in Paris
awarded the claimant US $45 million on a theory of ‘lost chance’ (perte de
chance de poursuivre le projet). The parties, however, seem to have focused on a
theory of lost profits (gain manqué), which the arbitrators might have found less
than satisfying with respect to a mine not yet operative.30
The court vacated the award for violation of provisions in the Code de
procédure civile related to the right to be heard (principe du contradictoire) and
public policy (ordre public).31 Although not questioning the assumption that
arbitrators know the law, often expressed as jura novit curia,32 the court found
effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law.’ The Rules of the London Court of International
Arbitration provide in art 32.2, ‘In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the LCIA Court, the
Arbitral Tribunal and the parties shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every reasonable effort to
ensure that an award is legally enforceable.’
29 La Société Commercial Caribbean Niquel c. La Société Overseas Mining Investments Ltd, Paris Court of
Appeals, 1st Chamber, 08/23901, 25 March 2010.
30 Indeed, the tribunal held that calculating the lost economic benefit was too uncertain, whereas calculating
the value of the chance to take advantage of an economic opportunity could ‘undeniably’ be evaluated. The
tribunal therefore based the reasoning in its award on the legal theory that the party should be compensated for
the economic value of the lost opportunity.
31 The notion commonly called ‘le principe du contradictoire’ has been memorialized in the Code de procédure
civile as ‘le principe de la contradiction’. At the time of the decision, these provisions were contained in art 1502 of
the Code de procedure civile, but now have been shifted to art 1520. See Décret no 2011–48, 13 January 2011. In
both the old and the new articles, the relevant text reads as follows:
Lappel de la décision qui accorde la reconnaissance ou l’exécution n’est ouvert que dans les cas suivants:
**** 48 Lorsque le principe de la contradiction n’a pas été respecté; 58 Si la reconnaissance ou l’exécution
sont contraires à l’ordre public international.
32 For a recent decision on the judge’s ability to deal with questions of law, see Judge Posner’s concurrence in
Bodum USA v La Cafetière Inc, 621 F3d 624, 631–38 (7th Cir 2010). Although Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows a court to take into account any admissible evidence in understanding a rule of foreign
law, including expert testimony, it does not require reliance on an expert. Federal courts in the United States
regularly apply the law of all 50 states without necessarily being well versed in the intricacies of state law, and
without relying on expert testimony, because ‘judges are experts on law’. Party-appointed experts, however, are
Arbitration in Autumn 7
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it unacceptable that an award should rest on a theory of damages which the
court assumed, rightly or wrongly, had not been addressed by counsel.33
B. Conflicting Duties
The decision provides a stark example of the difficulty in balancing various
arbitral duties. Each alternative approach seems to spring its own trap.34 In
particular, measures aimed at reducing cost can diminish the litigants’
opportunity to present their cases.
Imagine that the arbitrators in the midst of their deliberations had re-opened
the proceedings to set a briefing schedule on the new legal theory of lost
chance. Loud moaning would have been heard about added expense and delay.
In raising the new theory with the parties, to provide counsel an opportunity
to comment, the tribunal might also have exposed itself to criticism about lack
of even-handed impartiality. The respondent would likely have said, with some
justification, ‘Hey! You arbitrators are acting as counselors for claimant,
sending a not-so-subtle signal that its chances of success will be greater with an
amended pleading that includes a new method of damages calculation.’
Finally, it would have been equally problematic for the arbitrators to decide
the case without any consideration of the ‘lost chance’ measure of damages.
Granting recovery simply for lost profits would not necessarily have yielded a
correct amount. Denying recovery entirely would have penalized an otherwise
meritorious claim simply because of nuances in related recovery theories not
apparent to counsel, particularly in an international case with counsel from
different legal cultures.35
Tensions thus exist not only among the various arbitral duties, but within the
notion of procedural fairness itself, which encompasses a variety of distinct yet
chosen not because of their objective expertise in a country’s law, but rather because his or her interpretation of
that law helps the appointing party.
33 Other decisions in both France and Switzerland have come to similar conclusions. In Engel Austria v Don
Trade (Paris Cour d’appel, 3 December 2009), the court annulled the award for having been based on
‘imprévision’ (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage) without giving the parties an adequate opportunity to comment on
that doctrine. See Andrea Carlevaris, L’arbitre international entre Charybde et Scylla: le principe de la contradiction et
impartialité de l’arbitre, Les Cahiers De l’arbitrage (2001–02) 433. When faced with a similar problem, the highest
court in Switzerland, the Tribunal fédéral, or Bundesgericht, annulled a decision of the Tribunal Arbitral du Sport
for voiding an exclusivity clause on the basis of a law never discussed with the parties. See José Urquijo Goitia c/
Liedson Da Silva Muñiz, Tribunal fédéral, 9 February 2009. However, the trend is not universal. See Supreme
Court of Finland, Werfen Austria GmbH v Polar Electro Europe BV, Zug Branch, 2 July 2008.
34 For a thoughtful discussion of the delicate balance involved in arbitral duties, see Walking a Thin Line:
What an Arbitrator Can Do, Must Do or Must Not Do (Belgian Centre for Arbitration and Mediation, CEPANI40,
Colloquium 29 September 2010). Contributions include essays by Maud Piers, Marc Dal, Jan Schäfer, Caroline
Verbruggen, Bernd Ehle, Dirk de Meulemeester, Joana Kolber and Olivier Caprasse, addressing inter alia the
arbitrator as ‘private judge’ as well as the arbitrator’s role in ascertaining applicable law and costs.
35 Although an arbitrator must hear the parties’ arguments on any legal theory, it is not always easy to draw a
line between legal reasoning (which is properly presented in the arbitral award) and the legal theories on which
the award is based (on which the parties must be allowed to comment). Fear of stepping over the line cautions
arbitrators away from suggesting new legal theories, and potentially appearing to favour one side or the other. La
Semaine Juridique Ed G, No 23 (7 June 2010) 1202–03, obs, Christophe Seraglini.
Journal of International Dispute Settlement8
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related obligations which in practice often compete against each other.
Allowing an opportunity to address a new legal theory promotes the parties’
right to be heard. Yet suggesting the new theory in the first place potentially
opens the door to a charge of bias. In the words of an old American adage,
arbitrators will be damned if they do and damned if they do not.36
5. Arbitral Jurisdiction
A. The Parcel Tankers Case
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen v
AnimalFeeds37 presents another testing ground for the elusive balance among
an arbitrator’s various duties. The case arose from actions for price fixing
against several ship owners by customers who had chartered vessels commonly
known as ‘parcel tankers’ to transport liquids such as food oils and chemicals.
The customers alleged that the owners had engaged in anti-competitive
practices.38 All of the charter parties included similar arbitration clauses.
The customers requested a single consolidated proceeding to address their
combined claims, often known as ‘class action arbitration’ borrowing a term
from American court procedures.39 The customers may have felt that
consolidation would permit them to muster more significant legal firepower
and to reduce legal costs to the level of making the litigation worthwhile.40
36 On the interaction between an arbitrator’s discretion to craft proceedings and the elements of due process,
see eg William W. Park, ‘Two Faces of Progress: Fairness and Flexibility in Arbitral Procedure’ 23 (2007) Arb
Int’l 499.
37 Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 130 S Ct 1758 (2010).
38 In a companion criminal case, Stolt-Nielsen itself had admitted to engaging in an illegal cartel. In
exchange, the Department of Justice granted amnesty. In 2003, however, the Department of Justice attempted to
renegotiate the deal, claiming Stolt-Nielsen had failed to take corrective action. In 2007, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the Department of Justice could not withdraw its bargain once Stolt-Nielsen executives
had relinquished their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. United States v Stolt-Nielsen, SA, 524 F.
Supp 2d 586 (ED Pa 2007).
39 Although slightly misleading in the context of arbitration, the term ‘class action arbitration’ is now widely
used to describe consolidated arbitration proceedings. In a true class action, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a small number of plaintiffs is ‘certified’ to represent a larger class of plaintiffs who have
substantially similar claims, whether they know it or not. By contrast, in Stolt-Nielsen there was no attempt to join
parties who had not signed arbitration agreements with each other. In essence, the term is used as another way to
describe consolidation of related claims and counterclaims which implicate different parties, all of whom have
agreed to arbitration with each other on a bilateral basis, if not necessarily in a group proceeding. Herein, ‘class
action arbitration’ and ‘class arbitration’ will be used interchangeably to refer to consolidation of arbitral
proceedings.
40 During the arbitration proceeding, counsel for AnimalFeeds argued that the claims against Stolt-Nielsen
were ‘negative value’ claims that would cost more to litigate than could be recovered in case of a victory.
Transcript of Stolt-Nielsen arbitration, at 82a–83a. Rightly or wrongly, Justice Ginsburg in her dissent suggested
that ‘only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30’. See Stolt-Nielsen (n 37), 130 S Ct 1783. One can only speculate on
the effect of this ‘negative value’ on the settlement reached between Stolt-Nielsen and AnimalFeeds on 26
October 2010, when the District Court for the District of Connecticut approved AnimalFeeds’ voluntary
dismissal of its claim. On the effect of ‘negative value’ claims, see generally Robert G. Bone, The Economics of
Civil Procedure (Foundation Press 2003).
Arbitration in Autumn 9
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After a district court had ordered consolidation of related court actions, the
parties agreed to constitute an arbitral tribunal, pursuant to the American
Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules on Class Arbitration (AAA
Supplementary Rules),41 to address whether the various arbitrations could and
should be consolidated.42 In a partial award, the tribunal construed the
arbitration clause to permit class arbitration. This left to a subsequent stage the
determination of whether consolidation should in fact be ordered on a finding
that the AAA Supplementary Rules had been met, including a determination of
common questions of law and fact among the claims.
B. Excess of Authority
The asserted efficiencies in class arbitration, with savings from grouping related
claims into a single case, did not impress the ship owners, which sought to
vacate the award for excess of authority under the Federal Arbitration Act.43
Ultimately a majority of the US Supreme Court44 held that the arbitrators had
exceeded their authority by imposing personal views of sound policy rather
than deciding pursuant to applicable law as it then existed.45 The Court based
its conclusion on a somewhat unusual feature of the case, which was a
post-dispute stipulation concluded by the parties confirming that their
contracts were silent on the matter of class action arbitrations, in the sense
that ‘no agreement’ had been reached. Significantly, the Court did not say that
parties must agree explicitly to class arbitration, but simply that the case at bar
implicated no agreement, whether explicit or implicit.46
In the view of the majority, the ship owners’ procedural right not to be
subject to a class arbitration trumped the arbitrators’ ability to craft a more
efficient proceeding. Procedural fairness, in giving effect to the parties’ original
41 The agreement to AAA arbitration came after a district court had ordered consolidation of related
anti-trust proceedings pending before that court. See Re Parcel Tanker Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation,
296 F Supp 2d 1370 (JPML 2003).
42 AnimalFeeds brought the claim on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated in a putative class action
against Stolt-Nielsen, Odfjell, Jo Tankers and Tokyo Marine.
43 FAA s10(a)(4) ‘arbitrators exceeded their powers’.
44 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court was authored by Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Breyer and
Stevens. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, the District Court for the Southern District of New York had
vacated the award, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Although Justice Sotomayor took no part
in the Supreme Court’s decision, having been on the Second Circuit when the case was on appeal, she did agree
with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer later that year by joining a dissent in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc v
Jackson, 130 S Ct 2772 (2010), another politicized case addressing arbitral jurisdiction.
45 Justice Alito wrote, ‘It is only when an arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the
agreement and effectively dispenses his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may be unenforceable. In
that situation, an arbitration decision may be vacated under s 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the
arbitrator ‘‘exceeded [his] powers,’’ for the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make
public policy. In this case, we must conclude that what the arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own
view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.’ Stolt-Nielsen (n 37) 1767–1768.
46 See Stolt-Nielsen (n 37), 130 S Ct 1782, fn 10: ‘We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may
support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration.’
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agreement, proved more important than avoiding costs which might otherwise
discourage pursuit of the claim.
C. The Political Context
The decision divided the Court sharply along political lines. A vigorous dissent
by three of the more liberal Court members argued that the arbitrators were
simply doing what the parties had asked of them in the supplemental
arbitration agreement invoking the AAA Supplementary Rules.47
The political dimensions of the case resist simple analysis. American
conservatives tend to favour arbitration as a process in line with freedom of
contract. Yet their preferences get reversed for class proceedings, which appear
as an anti-business tool of plaintiffs’ lawyers fomenting litigation on a
contingency fee basis. In contrast, liberal justices often express skepticism of
arbitration as a device to sidestep the perceived safeguards of a civil jury.48 Yet
they seem to perceive class proceedings as a pro-consumer mechanism
permitting multiple litigants to engage jointly a legal team, making pursuit of
the claims feasible.49
D. The Right Answer to the Wrong Question
(i) The second agreement
The chief mischief of Stolt-Nielsen lies in its potential to decrease the finality of
arbitration by making it easier for courts to vacate awards. Few would disagree
that arbitrators must remain faithful to the parties’ contract, not create new
public policy.50 Unfortunately, the majority opinion took that general propos-
ition as an avenue to justify award annulment simply because the arbitrators
got it wrong on a question submitted for their determination.
47 The dissent pointed out that the parties had executed a supplementary agreement providing that the
question of whether the dispute should proceed as a class action arbitration was to be decided pursuant to the
AAA Supplementary Rules. Rule 3 of these rules explicitly grants the arbitrators jurisdiction to determine
whether the arbitration might, as a matter of contract, proceed on behalf of a class, assuming satisfaction of the
relevant criteria for class certification. Set forth in Rule 4, these factors largely parallel those in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
48 Liberal doubts about arbitration are not new. See eg the dissent by Justice Stevens in the landmark
Mitsubishi case allowing arbitration of anti-trust claims in an international context. Stevens wrote, ‘Consideration
of a fully developed record by a jury, instructed in the law by a federal judge, and subject to appellate review, is a
surer guide to the competitive character of a commercial practice than the practically unreviewable judgment of a
private arbitrator.’ Mitsubishi Motors v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 US 614 (1985) 666.
49 The current vogue for protecting consumers from arbitration in the United States can be seen in the
Dodd-Frank Act (21 July 2010) which invalidates (or in some cases permits invalidation of) pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in cases with deemed imbalances in bargaining power. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L 111–203, 124 Stat 1376–2223. If enacted, the pending Arbitration
Fairness Act would yield similar results on a broader scale. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, HR 1020, 111th
Cong (2009). See also Department of Defense Regulation Restricting the Use of Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements, 48 CFR ss 212, 222 and 252 (19 May 2010).
50 The Stolt-Nielsen (n 37) majority opinion at 1767–68 declared that the award must be vacated because the
tribunal simply ‘impose[d] its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration’.
Arbitration in Autumn 11
JNLIDS Vol2 No2 Sept 2011 05636595.indd   13 10/8/11   08:10:47
In its zeal to send a signal of the admittedly problematic nature of class
action arbitration, the majority conflated two distinct questions. The first
relates to the limits of an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, which falls within the
province of a national court’s review. The second concerns merits of an
arbitrator’s substantive decision, which courts would not normally disturb.51
The opinion by Justice Alito rightly noted the parties’ post-dispute
stipulation that the contract was silent in the sense of containing ‘no
agreement’ on class action arbitration. However, the litigants had unequivocally
asked arbitrators, not judges, to construe their ex ante intent on class
arbitration. Article 3 of the AAA Supplementary Rules, titled ‘Construction
of the Arbitration Clause’, provides the arbitrators with an explicit grant of
jurisdiction as follows:
Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a
reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether
the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or
against a class (the ‘Clause Construction Award’).52
The arbitrators were thus empowered by the parties to address whether the
arbitration clause permitted the case to proceed on behalf of a class.53 The
litigants moved the class action question to the realm of the dispute’s
substantive merits, which under the Federal Arbitration Act normally remains
within the purview of the arbitrators.
In essence, the majority gave the right answer to the wrong question. The
relevant inquiry facing the Court was not, ‘What did the parties agree in
general?’ but the more limited issue, ‘What did the parties agree to arbitrate?’
By accepting the AAA Supplementary Rules, the parties gave to the arbitrators
the question of whether the contract allowed class action arbitration, thus
generally precluding judicial second-guessing on that matter. Courts might still
intervene to monitor bias or lack of due process, but not to correct a simple
mistake in the arbitrators’ contract interpretation.
(ii) Substantive merits versus arbitral jurisdiction
In holding that the award should be vacated, the majority invoked excess of
authority by the arbitral tribunal, one of the limited statutory grounds for
51 See generally, William W Park, ‘The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction’ in A.J. van den
Berg (ed), 13 ICCA Congress Series 55 (2007).
52 Moreover, Rule 3 recognizes that such a determination will be considered an award subject to review
pursuant to the delineated grounds for vacatur, but no more, as provided in the Federal Arbitration Act. The
Rule continues, ‘The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the issuance of the Clause Construction
Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party to move a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or
to vacate the Clause Construction Award.’ The point of Rule 3 is to construe the contract, as a threshold matter,
to determine whether the parties agreed to submit their dispute to class arbitration at all.
53 The applicability of these AAA procedures was explicitly recognized by the majority. See Stolt-Nielsen
(n 37), 130 S Ct 1765.
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vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act.54 Under the facts of the case,
however, the Court may well have blurred the distinction between excess of
jurisdiction and simple mistake of law, dressing the latter in the garb of the
former.
True enough, articulating a robust definition of excess of authority has often
proved elusive.55 On the basis that litigants do not expressly empower
arbitrators to make mistakes, at least one judge has gone so far as to suggest
that errors always constitute an excess of authority.56
Such a stretch, however, ignores that the parties asked an arbitrator, not a
judge, to decide the case, assuming the risk that the arbitrator might get it
wrong. Nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act permits judges to impose their
own views on matters submitted to arbitration. The integrity of the arbitral
process requires not only that judges scrutinize gateway matters related to the
contours of the litigants’ agreement to arbitrate, but equally that courts respect
the arbitrators’ decisions on questions given to them for adjudication.
In this context, one may recall words used from an earlier US Supreme
Court decision addressing a dispute between a New York merchant and an
Illinois store owner before arbitrators who ultimately awarded damages to the
ill-treated storekeeper. Having lost in arbitration, the unhappy New Yorker
succeeded in having the award set aside by a lower court. The Supreme Court
reversed with the following reasoning:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it
aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the
judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary] in place of the judges chosen by the parties
[the arbitrators], and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of
litigation.57
Litigants should not be allowed to renege on their bargain to arbitrate simply
when a decision proves not to their liking.
54 9 USC s 10(a)(4) provides award annulment if arbitrators have ‘exceeded their powers’.
55 Attempts to define jurisdiction sometimes bring to mind the line by US Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart, admitting an inability to define ‘hard core’ obscenity but adding, ‘I know it when I see it.’ Jacobellis v
Ohio, 378 US 184 (1964) at 197 (concurring opinion), examining when erotic expression falls outside the limits
of Constitutionally protected speech in the context of a Louis Malle film Les Amants about a woman in an
unhappy marriage. British judges sometimes apply a less risqué characterization test. In deciding that a floating
crane was not a ‘ship or vessel’ for purposes of insurance policy, Lord Justice Scrutton referred to the gentleman
who ‘could not define an elephant but knew what it was when he saw one.’ Merchants Marine Insurance Co. Ltd v
North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association, [1926] 26 Lloyd’s Rep 201, 203; 32 Com Cas 165, 172.
56 The great English jurist Lord Denning once suggested (albeit in an administrative context) that ‘Whenever
a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.’ See Lord
Denning, The Discipline of the Law (OUP 1979) 74. See also Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School,
[1978] 3 WLR 736, 743 (CA) (‘The distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction and an
error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . that it is rapidly being eroded.’). Happily for the health of English
law, the House of Lords in 2005 rejected this position several years ago in the Lesotho Highlands Development
Authority v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43 (30 June 2005).
57 Burchell v Marsh, 58 US 344, 349 (1855).
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There is nothing odd in saying that parties express their intent to arbitrate
matters which might otherwise be jurisdictional in nature. For example,
allegations that the signature in an arbitration clause had been forged would
normally give rise to a judicial review. Yet it would always be up to the parties
to agree that the allegation of forgery should be arbitrated,58 in which case the
arbitrator would be the one to determine the genuineness of the signature.59
At some point, of course, arbitrators might simply invent a legal standard
informed only by their personal policy preferences.60 In such an instance, they
would be exceeding their authority. The facts of Stolt-Nielsen, however, do not
lend themselves to painting the arbitrators as such wild cards.61
It may well be that the majority’s aversion to forced joinder represents sound
policy. Absent legislative pronouncement banning class arbitration, however, it
was for the parties to adopt whatever path they preferred. Under the facts in
Stolt-Nielsen, they had asked arbitrators, not courts, to interpret their
agreement on this matter. In this respect, the dissent fared better in construing
the various agreements together, reading the ‘no agreement’ stipulation in
conjunction with the post-dispute adoption of the AAA Supplementary
Rules.62
58 With respect to the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate (such as raised by the allegations of
forgery), a separate post-dispute agreement to arbitrate would normally be needed to confer arbitral jurisdiction.
By contrast, with respect to procedural matters (such as respect for time limits) the parties might well confer
arbitral authority in a single contract containing a clear mandate to arbitrate. See Howsam v Dean Witter, 537 US
79 (2002), addressing the right to interpret a requirement that arbitration be filed within 6 years after ‘the
occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute’.
59 Such delegation of jurisdictional authority in a separate agreement is exactly what happened in Astro
Valiente Compania Naviera v Pakistan Ministry of Food & Agriculture (The Emmanuel Colocotronis No 2), [1982],
1 All ER 823, where buyers of wheat refused to arbitrate a dispute with the shipper on the theory that the
arbitration clause in the charter party had not been incorporated in the bill of lading. The parties submitted to ad
hoc arbitration the question of whether the arbitration clause was incorporated into the bill of lading, and were
subsequently held to be bound by an award finding that the buyers had agreed to arbitrate based on language in
the bill of lading providing ‘All other conditions . . . as per . . . charter party’.
60 The sting in the majority’s vacatur of the award lies in the line, ‘what the arbitration panel did was simply
to impose its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.’ Stolt-Nielsen (n 37) 1767–68. However, Justice
Ginsberg in her dissent notes that the tribunal did in fact tie its conclusion ‘to New York law, federal maritime
law, and decisions made by other panels pursuant to Rule 3 [of the AAA Supplementary Rules].’ 130 S Ct 1780.
61 In Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitrators’ understanding of the law was made on the basis of an earlier US Supreme
Court decision in which a mere plurality of the Court held that determinations on consolidation were for the
arbitrators themselves. See Green Tree v Bazzle, 539 US 444 (2003). The legacy of this case was anything but
clear. None of the four opinions in Bazzle commanded a majority. The plurality felt that the arbitrator should
decide whether the parties’ agreement allowed for class action arbitration. Justice Stevens concurred with the
outcome but did not endorse its reasoning. The dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the parties’
contract demonstrated no consent to class action arbitration. The dissent by Justice Thomas noted that the case
originated before South Carolina states courts, and contended that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to
state proceedings. In the context of the point made by Justice Thomas, it is interesting that Stolt-Nielsen
implicated a maritime matter, falling within the purview of federal rather than state law.
62 Although stressing that the award was not yet ‘ripe’ for review, the opinion by Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged the effect of the agreement to apply the AAA Supplementary Rules. Her dissent notes: ‘The
parties’ supplemental agreement, referring the class-arbitration issue to an arbitration panel, undoubtedly
empowered the arbitrators to render their clause-construction decision. That scarcely debatable point should
resolve this case.’ 130 S Ct 1780.
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(iii) Opt-in For Class Members
The balance between efficiency and fairness finds further complications in the
way the AAA Supplementary Rules describe the criteria for class certification,
according to factors that largely parallel those set forth in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.63 As mentioned earlier, if arbitrators find that the contract
permits class action arbitration, they proceed to examine whether satisfaction
of other prerequisites (such as common issues of law and fact) justifies
proceedings on a class basis. Among these prerequisites is the requirement that
each class member has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration
clause substantially similar to the one signed by the class representative.
A careful observer will note the reference to an agreement by ‘each class
member’, which is to say, the claimant, not the respondent. On its face, such
language seems to leave open the prospect that a company which never had an
arbitration clause with the ship owners (to take the Stolt-Nielsen context) might
become part of the arbitration through a unilateral post-dispute ‘opt-in’
process. Lacking reciprocity, such a mechanism poses policy concerns of
significant magnitude, given that arbitration (unlike court proceedings)
presupposes consent.
Under the facts of Stolt-Nielsen, all owners and all customers had agreed
to arbitrate with each other through clauses in the charter-parties.64
Consolidation simply moved things from bilateral to multilateral
proceedings, without deeming into life an agreement to arbitrate where none
had existed.
The calculus for class arbitration, however, would change dramatically if a
unilateral ‘opt-in’ process were to bring into the arbitration potential claimants
with which respondents had never concluded any arbitration agreement at all.65
Courts must show special vigilance in connection with attempts to extend
arbitration clauses to non-signatories,66 a much-vexed matter that recently gave
63 AAA Supplementary Rule 4 provides that the arbitrator shall permit one or more parties to represent the
class only if each of the following conditions is met: (i) class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations is
impracticable; (ii) questions of law or fact common to the class; (iii) claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; (iv) representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the class interests; (v) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect the class
interests and (vi) each class member has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause substantially
similar to that signed by the class representative(s) and other class members.
64 Stolt-Nielsen (n 37), 130 SCt 1765.
65 Statutory court-ordered consolidation of arbitration is a different matter, of course, given that all parties
will presumably be subject to the relevant judicial jurisdiction. See eg Mass Gen Laws, ch 251, s 2A, allowing
consolidation of actions involving a common question of law or fact, held applicable in federal cases, at least if
the parties’ agreement is silent on the matter. New England Energy v Keystone Shipping, 855 F2d 1 (1st Cir 1988)
See also Mass Gen Laws ch 90 s 7N1/2, requiring non-voluntary arbitration of claims over allegedly defective
vehicles. See also Cal Code Civil Procedure, s 1281.3, which permits consolidation of arbitration proceedings
that involve a common issue of law or fact. Compare Gov of United Kingdom v Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 69 (2d
Cir 1993), limiting judicial discretion to grant consolidation of arbitration proceedings ‘absent the parties’
agreement to allow such consolidation’.
66 Non-signatories may sometimes be brought into proceedings on the basis of agency or corporate veil
piercing. See generally, William W Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma, in
Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Multiple Party Actions in International Arbitration 3 (OUP 2009). The US
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rise to conflicting high-profile decisions in France and Britain during the
Dallah saga.67 Like marriage, commercial arbitration implicates mutual
consent, not an open-ended option to be exercised by a host of partners.68
E. A Legacy of Open Questions
Although the peculiar facts of Stolt-Nielsen limit its precedential value,69 the
case does signal greater latitude for award annulment. By ignoring the litigants’
agreement to arbitrate the question of whether class proceedings were
authorized, the decision raises the prospect that arbitration will become mere
foreplay to litigation.
Apart from sowing confusion on the allocation of tasks between judges and
arbitrators, the case leaves a legacy of open questions. For example, the
majority provides little if any guidance on factors that might demonstrate the
parties’ intent to permit class arbitration. In a key footnote, the majority punts
to future decisions the important question of how to define the contours of an
agreement to class action proceedings, stating ‘We have no occasion to decide
what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed to
authorize class-action arbitration.’70
Likewise, the Court fails to address the much-vexed matter of whether
‘manifest disregard of the law’ continues to exist as an independent ground for
review of arbitral awards.71 Instead, the decision says only that if such a
Supreme Court, of course, is well aware of the various theories on which non-signatories might be joined in
arbitration. See Arthur Andersen v Carlisle, 129 S Ct 1896 (2009) (addressing notions of third party beneficiaries).
67 See Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Government of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46 (3 November
2010), implicating an award made in Paris but presented for enforcement in Britain. Although the British
Supreme Court held that there was no justification to join the government of Pakistan, the Paris Cour d’appel
came to an opposite decision on 17 February 2011. In determining whether Pakistan was bound, each court
purported to apply the same principles of French law, known as the Dalico rule, emphasizing the ‘common will of
the parties’ (commune volonté des parties) as a transnational standard free from the idiosyncrasies of national law.
As Dallah illustrates, however, transnational principles may prove themselves stubbornly parochial in their
application. The French court emphasized post-contract behaviour by the government of Pakistan, while the
British focused on the relationship of the parties. For a general discussion of the conceptual difficulties in
determining the applicable law for purposes of joining non-signatories, including New York Convention Art
V(1)(a) which tests the validity of an arbitration agreement by the law of the country where the award is made,
see William W Park, ‘Rules and Standards in Private International Law’ (2007) 73 Arbitration 441, 444.
68 A different analysis applies to proceedings based on bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements,
where host states provide standing offers to arbitrate with potential investors.
69 The decision rests on an explicit ‘no agreement’ stipulation not likely to be repeated if the parties resisting
class arbitration have competent counsel. For a scholarly perspective on the effect of Stolt-Nielsen in future cases,
see SI Strong, ‘Opening More Doors than it Closes’ (2010) Lloyd’s Maritime and Consumer Law Quaterly 565.
70 See Stolt-Nielsen (n 37)130 S Ct 1782, fn 10.
71 First introduced in dictum of the 1953 US Supreme Court decision Wilko v Swann, ‘manifest disregard of
the law’ has raised considerable concern in some quarters. See eg the opinion by Chief Judge Posner in Baravati
v Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc, 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7 Cir 1994), which refers to the doctrine as having been
‘[c]reated ex nihilo [as] a nonstatutory ground for setting aside arbitral awards.’ Judge Posner, continued: ‘If
[manifest disregard] is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the
entire modern law of arbitration. If it is intended to be synonymous with the statutory formula that it most nearly
resembles-whether the arbitrators ‘‘exceeded their powers’’-it is superfluous and confusing.’
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standard exists, it was satisfied under the facts of Stolt-Nielsen,72 thus leaving
the vitality of the doctrine open to question.73
Regardless of any substantive guidance it may offer, the decision will likely
provoke further politicization of arbitration in the United States.74 The drama
springs from idiosyncrasies of American legal culture, including the absence of
any general nation-wide statute to insulate consumers and employees from
abusive arbitration arrangements,75 and doubts about the reliability of civil
juries, sometimes perceived as facilitating unreasonable verdicts tainted with
bias against manufacturers or employers.
One of the next battlegrounds will implicate contractual waivers of class
action arbitration.76 In one federal appellate case, the court invalidated a
waiver of class action arbitration even after an earlier decision was remanded by
the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen.77 The court
maintained its view that the waiver was invalid because it raised the cost of
arbitration so as to preclude plaintiffs from enforcing statutory rights under
competition law.
Such an approach leaves respondents in a difficult position. If a contract
contains a class action waiver, a judge would be unable to compel class
proceedings due to the decision in Stolt-Nielsen that requires agreement on the
matter. Yet the same judge might feel unable to grant a motion for non-class
arbitration, considering bilateral proceedings to be unconscionable because the
cost effectively denies claimant an ability to enforce statutory rights on an
individual basis. Practitioners will in any event focus more on drafting
72 See Stolt-Nielsen (n 37), 130 S Ct 1768, fn 3: ‘We do not decide whether ‘‘manifest disregard’’
survives . . . as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set
forth at 9 USC s 10.’ The Court then continued, ‘Assuming, arguendo, that such a standard applies, we find it
satisfied for the reasons that follow [in the majority opinion].’
73 Whether ‘manifest disregard of the law’ exists as an independent ground for judicial review of awards was
put into doubt by the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Hall Street v Mattel, 552 US 576. Stolt-Nielsen avoided the
question by stating that if such a standard exists it was satisfied. 130 S Ct 1768, fn 3. The Supreme Court passed
up another opportunity to consider ‘manifest disregard’ in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Lagstein, 607
F 3d 634 (9th Cir 2010), petition for cert denied.
74 For the current state of controversy over the costs and benefits of arbitration in the United States, readers
are directed to the history of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, HR 1020 & S 931 (111th Congress, 1st
Session).
75 The US Congress, however, can and has passed legislation limiting arbitration on behalf of special interest
groups. See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act of 2002, s 11028, Pub L No 107–273, 116 Stat 1758,
1835–36 (codified at 15 USC s 1226 (2000)), sometimes known as the Bono Bill in recognition of its original
sponsor, the late Sonny Bono. Recently, Senators Jeff Sessions and Russell Feingold proposed a bill intended to
provide broad protection of consumer interests, albeit perhaps of an over-inclusive nature that sacrifices vital
elements of party autonomy and efficient dispute resolution.
76 The effectiveness of waivers drafted to preclude recourse to class action arbitration is currently before the
US Supreme Court in its review of a decision by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in AT&T
Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 131 S Ct 45 (2010). Oral arguments heard on 9 November 2010 explored whether
the Federal Arbitration Act preempts reliance on state law related to unconscionability principles that might be
invoked to strike down such waivers.
77 See Re Am Express Merchants Litigation, 2011 WL 781698 (2d Cir, 8 March 2011).
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arbitration clauses,78 whether within the framework of consumer transactions
or business-to-business contracts.79
Finally, Stolt-Nielsen raises the question whether courts outside the United
States will stay legal actions in conflict with class arbitration if and when
arbitrators allow unilateral ‘opt-in’ by individuals or companies which had not
previously agreed to arbitrate.80 In the context of litigation in France or
England, for example, it is far from evident that a French or English court
would refuse to hear a claim merely because a respondent had opted into a
class proceeding in the United States.
Whatever lessons might or might not be apparent from Stolt-Nielsen, the case
is sure to highlight the way in which tensions among the arbitrator’s various
duties resist facile analysis. In large measure, resolving these tensions, to
promote an optimal accommodation among the different obligations, will
depend on honest and mature debate about the relevant rivalries.81
6. Signposts to the Future
Lectures about legal trends often speculate on the future, a mission fraught
with peril.82 If arbitrators had special knowledge of what lies in store, they
would be in another business.83 Although tomorrow cannot be built on an
assumption of yesterday’s permanence, it must nevertheless be built on
something. Our knowledge of yesterday and today usually provides the only
possible starting point.84 With this caution, let us explore challenges of the next
decade.
78 See Paul Friedland and Michael Ottolenghi, ‘Drafting Class Action Clauses After Stolt-Nielsen’ (2010) 65
Dispute Res J 22, who suggest explicitly addressing the question of class action arbitration in the arbitration
clause to avoid any confusion resulting from how future courts will interpret Stolt-Nielsen.
79 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen were sophisticated businesses with
sufficient resources and experience to bargain, rather than parties subject to contracts of adhesion. Whether this
argument cuts in favour or against a presumption to allow class action arbitration remains an open question.
Stolt-Nielsen (n 37), 130 S Ct at 1783.
80 See above the discussion of Rule 4(6) of the AAA Supplementary Class Arbitration, which makes
references to agreements by ‘each class member’, (ie the claimant) to enter the arbitration, irrespective of any
prior agreement to arbitrate with the respondent.
81 See generally, William W Park, ‘Les devoirs de l’arbitre: ni un pour tous, ni tous pour un’ (2011) Cahiers
De l’Arbitrage 13.
82 A brief look into our past provides a stern reminder of the limits of forecasts. This lecture was delivered on
29 September, the date when, at the 1938 Munich conference, the so-called four Great Powers of Europe
partitioned Czechoslovakia, granting Adolf Hitler the Sudetenland region of that country. When the agreement
was announced the next morning, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hailed it as a guarantee of ‘peace
in our time.’ Less than a year later Europe was experiencing anything but peace, as the Second World War was
beginning.
83 It has been observed that prediction is particularly difficult when it concerns the future. Attributed to
French Resistance leader Pierre Dac: ‘La prévision est difficile surtout lorsqu’elle concerne l’avenir.’ For a more
systematic treatment of the unforeseeable nature of great events see Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan
(2007).
84 Even the computational algorithms used in the random sampling of so-called Monte Carlo Simulations
derive from knowledge linked to past experience.
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A. Arbitral Duties and Societal Values
The right way to do things from the arbitrator’s perspective may be the wrong
way to do things from the viewpoint of the society at large. The general
community often has a stake not only in the outcome of arbitration, but also in
the way proceedings have been conducted.85
A recent English Court of Appeal decision, now on appeal, provides an
example of one of the less tractable conflicts between the expectations of the
arbitration community and the values of society at large.86 The court struck
down an arbitration clause providing for a tribunal composed of Ismaili
Muslims, deemed to violate the anti-discrimination provisions of British law
based on a European Union human rights Directive,87 finding the allegedly
discriminatory provision not severable from the general duty to arbitrate.88
Concern has been expressed within the arbitration community that the logic,
which prohibits religion from being taken into account would also apply to
nationality-based considerations in arbitral appointments. From that perspec-
tive, an extension of the court’s logic runs afoul of the practice of many arbitral
rules and institutions that see nationality requirements as surrogates for
impartiality, intended to foster a sense of fair play.
Traditionally, litigants have insisted on a default rule by which the sole
arbitrator or tribunal president should not share the nationality of either side.
In a dispute between a Paris claimant and a Boston respondent, there is
nothing odd about asking that the presiding arbitrator be neither French nor
American, however fine and noble the respective candidates from those two
countries might otherwise be. If the parties want a different rule, they can
always agree otherwise.
85 In some instances the conflicts between public and private interests will be more theoretical than real, as
exemplified in matter of arbitral confidentiality. If arbitration implicates societal interests, the public wants to
watch, as demonstrated by calls for transparency with respect to investor-state disputes. Yet when such
proceedings have been opened to the public, hearings usually prove so utterly boring that the audience dwindles
quickly. Moreover, investor-state awards usually end up being published, in full or in sanitized versions, providing
some accommodation between the public and private interests.
86 Jivraj v Hashwani, [2010] EWCA Civ 712.
87 A business dispute arose between two individuals who were members of the Ismaili Muslim community, a
branch of Sunni Islam. The agreement to arbitrate provided that the arbitrators be members of that community.
When one side had second thoughts and appointed a retired English judge who was not Muslim, the clause was
challenged as a violation of the Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulation of 2003, which had been
introduced into English law to comply with a European Union Directive. EU Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
The Court held that arbitrators are ‘employees’ within the meaning of the Regulation and that the provision for
only appointing Ismaili arbitrators violated the anti-discrimination provisions.
88 For a contrasting New York decision in which a religious requirement was severed from the general duty
to arbitrate, see Re Ismailoff and others, 836 NYS 2d 493 (2007, Table Decision, Surrogate’s Court, Nassau
County, New York), 14 Misc 3d 1229, 2007 WL 431024. Faced with an arbitration clause requiring arbitrators
to be ‘persons of the Orthodox Jewish faith’, the court felt unable to make the appointment due to the
Constitutional provisions (First Amendment, Establishment Clause) prohibiting civil courts from resolving issues
concerning religious doctrine, as enunciated by the US Supreme court in Presbyterian Church v Hull Church, 393
US 440 (1969). A general reference to a Beth Din (Jewish rabbinical court) would have been acceptable, since
the court would not have been required to pass judgment on who was or was not a member of the Orthodox
Jewish faith. In the end, the court avoided the problem by having each side name one arbitrator, and designating
the American Arbitration Association to appoint the third tribunal member in the event of further disagreement.
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The nationality requirement affects both sides equally, and operates to
reduce fears and perceptions of bias, which in a cross-border context may be
significant.89 One can imagine the outcry if an international sports match were
to be refereed by nationals of one of the two opposing teams. The principle of
party-autonomy, as well as understandable fear of bias, raises legitimate
apprehension about attempts to sanitize arbitral tribunals from all nationality
qualifications. The matter provokes more anxiety than certainty, and leaves
much suspense.
B. Enforceability Revisited
(i) Procedural rules on costs
Of all the arbitrators’ duties, the obligation to seek an enforceable award may
prove the most persistently troublesome, as it implicates not only tensions
among the various duties themselves, but also conflicts between the arbitral
seat and the law of the enforcement forum. To illustrate, few legal rules serve
as well as the English invalidation of pre-dispute agreements to allocate
arbitration costs ‘in any event’.90 In advance of the dispute, parties may not by
contract forbid an arbitrator from allocating costs on the basis of who won and
who lost.91
The provision casts a wide net, catching even reasonable arrangements
among sophisticated business managers to split arbitrator compensation on a
50/50 basis, and/or to require each side to cover its own legal expenses. In such
an instance, what is to be done by a conscientious arbitrator?
Aiming at fidelity to the parties’ agreement, an arbitrator would normally let
the costs lie where they fall. Yet to do so might run the risk of award
annulment if proceedings are seated in London. Arbitrators may find
themselves between a rock and a hard place when the award must be enforced
in a jurisdiction that values respect for the parties’ procedural choices.
Although flouting clear contract language on cost allocation would please an
89 Those with experience in international arbitration readily bring to mind many fine arbitrators for whom
nationality plays no role in decision-making. Moreover, the use of citizenship as a surrogate for legal culture or
national predisposition clearly has limits. Well-known arbitrators include an Irishman raised and educated in the
United States, a Bahraini citizen born in Sweden and living in Paris, and dual nationals who might have ties to
both Switzerland and the United States, or to both France and Brazil.
90 Section 60, Arbitration Act of 1996: ‘An agreement which has the effect that a party is to pay the whole or
part of the costs of the arbitration in any event is only valid if made after the dispute in question has arisen.’
Section 61 goes on to set forth the general principle that ‘costs should follow the event except where it appears to
the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs.’ This
standard, however, is made subject to the parties’ agreement otherwise, which in context with Section 60 would
be an agreement after the dispute has arisen.
91 The rule’s most understandable application lies in an anti-abuse mechanism to prevent clauses that would
require weaker parties to pay all costs, thus discouraging otherwise legitimate claims. To be clear, the statute does
not impose the English ‘costs follow the event’ rule, but simply invalidates pre-dispute attempts to eliminate the
arbitrator’s discretion in fixing obligations for items such as attorneys’ fees and amounts paid to the arbitrators
and the arbitral institution.
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English judge,92 the disregard of the parties’ ex ante expectations may appear as
excess of authority to a New York court called to enforce an award of legal
costs inconsistent with the terms of the agreement.93
(ii) Substantive mandatory norms
The double-edged nature of promoting award enforceability remains problem-
atic in respect of substantive as well as procedural norms. In the well-known
Mitsubishi case, the US Supreme Court considered a dispute between a
Japanese manufacturer and an American automobile distributor providing for
application of Swiss law by arbitrators in Japan.94 Ordering arbitration, the
Court nevertheless warned that American antitrust law must be considered
in connection with any antitrust counterclaim, despite the contractual
choice-of-law clause.95
The Mitsubishi pronouncements on US competition law, like the English rule
on cost allocation, place arbitrators between the Scylla and the Charybdis of
inconsistent requirements. An arbitrator must satisfy norms both at the arbitral
seat, where proceedings take place, and at the recognition forum, where the
winner goes to attach assets.
Another such conflict was presented in Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc,96
involving an English distributor of software products for a Canadian company,
pursuant to a license calling for application of Ontario law and arbitration in
Toronto. After the Canadian company attempted to terminate the license, an
arbitral tribunal in Toronto found for the distributor on a breach of contract
counterclaim. The tribunal rejected a parallel request for damages under EU
commercial agency regulations, considering the regulations outside the scope of
Ontario law.
A competing action was brought in England, where the Canadian company
argued that the Toronto award barred claims related to the EU Regulations.
Overturning a lower court stay of proceedings, the High Court required a
determination on whether the Regulations gave the distributor an action
independent of Ontario law.97 If so, the award would have no res judicata effect
92 Presumably Section 68 of the 1996 Act (serious irregularity causing substantial injustice) would permit
judicial intervention with respect to an arbitrator’s failure to respect Section 60.
93 Not infrequently, contracts between American policyholders and British insurers provide for London
arbitration but subject to New York substantive law. These so-called ‘Bermuda Form’ arbitrations have been
discussed in Richard Jacobs, Lorelie S Masters and Paul Stanley, Liability Insurance In International Arbitration,
The Bermuda Form (Hart Publishing UK, 2004).
94 Mitsubishi Motors v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 US 614 (1985). This particular choice of law explains
itself by the fact that a Swiss affiliate of the American company Chrysler was also involved in the contractual
arrangement with the distributor and the manufacturer.
95 ibid fn 19 suggests a ‘prospective waiver’ doctrine that would invalidate choice-of-law agreements that
operated to waive a right to pursue American remedies. Moreover, the so-called ‘second look’ doctrine warned
that American courts would exercise their power at the award enforcement stage to ‘‘ensure that the legitimate
interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws [of the United States] had been addressed.’ ibid 638.
96 [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB).
97 The High Court also expressed the view that if the EU Regulations did apply, a claim for compensation
would be governed by English law. Thus the award could not defeat the claim brought before the English court,
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on that matter.98 The English court thus raised the prospect that the EU
Regulations might constitute mandatory norms, not unlike the antitrust
counterclaims in Mitsubishi, from which the parties could not derogate.99
Such cases raise the vexed matter of divergence between an arbitrator’s
duties and the perspectives of courts called to intervene in the arbitral process.
Whatever the obligation of judges reviewing awards, arbitrators themselves
normally aim for fidelity to the parties’ bargain, and thus hesitate to ignore
explicit contract language, whether related to applicable law or cost allocation.
Judges are answerable to the citizenry as a whole, while arbitrators remain in
large measure creatures of contract.100
C. Refining Notions of Bias
Few would disagree that an arbitrator should hesitate to accept an appointment
after publishing an article on a genuinely open question of law forming the
precise object of the dispute. Yet, it would be alarming to allow overly abstract
notions of impartiality to disqualify arbitrators with knowledge and experience.
Pushed to an extreme, the author of a learned treatise on commercial law
might be challenged for knowing too well that contracts require offer and
acceptance.101 To exclude service by those with learning would leave
arbitration to dim-wits who live alone in caves, a state of affairs that hardly
serves economic justice or commercial security.102
given that the arbitrators had never addressed a matter they considered governed solely by Ontario law. ibid para
92.
98 The award was tested not in an application to refuse recognition, but rather in the collateral context of
Section 9 of the English Arbitration Act, which permits a stay of legal proceedings connected to matters governed
by an arbitration agreement, as long as that agreement does not fail for being null, void or inoperative. According
to the High Court, the district judge ‘fell into error’ by failing to determine whether a binding arbitration clause
applied to the claims under the EU Regulations, in the absence of which no award could be recognized on that
point. Opinion of Justice Tugendhat, para 95.
99 In this connection, it is important to note that the effect of the award was challenged in the context of a
competing legal claim brought in an English court. It may well be that the award would nevertheless retain its
vigor under Art III of the New York Convention in some other recognition forum. However, the peculiar facts of
this case make it unlikely for the Canadian company to rely on the award except as a bar to a rival judicial action.
Although the arbitral tribunal held for the distributor under Ontario law, the amount of quantum presumably
was far less than that available under the EU Regulations.
100 Of course, fidelity to the agreement would not justify violation of international public norms on matters
such as bribery, corruption or money laundering. However, for most matters on which sophisticated parties
bargain (applicable law, costs, and damage limitations) arbitrators normally strive to let the chips fall where they
may notwithstanding idiosyncratic local rules.
101 At least two recent analyses have emphasized the repeat arbitrators’ concern to maintain reputation as an
incentive to render fair and accurate awards. See generally, Daphna Kapeliuk, ‘The Repeat Appointment Factor:
Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators’ (2010) 96 Cornell L Rev 47; William W Park,
‘Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent’ (2009) 46 San Diego L Rev 629.
102 The requisite open-mindedness comes into play at the beginning of the case (lack of pre-judgment or
pre-disposition) not at the end of the arbitration, after evidence and argument have been heard and the arbitrator
must render an award. In this context, one remembers the observation attributed to GK Chesterton, to the effect
that ‘impartiality is a pompous name for indifference, which is an elegant name for ignorance’. Chesterton
probably had in mind a lack of sensitivity to violations of universal values (such as brutality or racism) rather than
adjudication of commercial disputes.
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D. Rehabilitating the Search for Truth
(i) Perceptions of accuracy
Assertions about the end of arbitration’s golden age often contain a disturbing
subtext which marginalizes an arbitrator’s search for truth when compared with
efficiency. Not long ago, at a major conference on truth seeking in arbitration,
several in-house lawyers suggested that what they really want from arbitrators is
simply imposition of a peace treaty providing a fair end (whatever that might
mean) to the commercial warfare.103 Along similar lines, much recent
arbitration literature focuses only on saving money and time,104 sometimes
with positive suggestions about making the process more efficient.
Without denying the value of speed and economy, thoughtful observers
might wonder whether the baby risks being thrown out with the bath water.105
Indeed, some have predicted a strong comeback for truth seeking in
arbitration.106 Not truth in some absolute sense, with a capital ‘T’ in the
mind of God. Rather, truth in sense of an accurate award, which in a
commercial context means fidelity to the parties’ bargain. As mentioned earlier,
arbitrators would normally seek to get as near as possible to understanding
what happened between the parties, to grasping what the contract says, and to
ascertaining what the applicable law provides.
Lawyers trained in some Continental traditions sometimes suggest that their
litigation tradition does not concern itself with seeking truth. What seems to be
meant, however, is that German or Swiss procedure lays stress on what has
sometimes been called the ‘formal truth’ rather than absolute truth: what the
documents demonstrate, rather than what may be true in the eyes of an
all-knowing Deity, thus permitting a more efficient administration of justice.107
103 The proceedings of the 2009 annual meeting of the Swiss Arbitration Association held in Zürich will soon
be published in the ASA Bulletin. In the interim, the meeting was reported in Nathalie Voser’s article ‘Document
Production in International Arbitration: What Does It Have to Do with Discovery?’ 3 (2009) World Arb Med
Rev 491, 489, stating that ‘four in-house counsel responsible for dispute resolution at large multi-national
companies unanimously expressed the view that the truth was not their primary concern in dispute resolution’.
104 See eg Jean-Claude Najar, ‘Inside Out: A User’s Perspective on Challenges in International Arbitration’
25 Arb. Int’l (2009) 515. After listing arbitration’s current defects, the author concludes, ‘By whatever means
necessary, arbitration needs to be repaired, to be returned to its simple foundations—speed, cost efficiency, and
user-friendliness.’ In the article’s introduction the ‘purpose’ of arbitration is defined as ‘cost efficiency, speed, and
user-friendliness’, with no reference to a reasonably correct result. For contemporary debate on efficiency, see
also Alan Redfern, ‘Stemming the Tide of Judicialisation of International Arbitration’ (2008) 2 World Arb Med
Rev 21, 37; Jean-Claude Najar, ‘A Pro Domo Pleading: Of In-House Counsel, and their Necessary Participation
in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 25 J Int’l Arb 623; Michael McIlwrath, ‘Ignoring the Elephant
in the Room: International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices’ (2008) 2 World Arb Med Rev 111;
Steven Seidenberg, ‘International Arbitration Loses Its Grip’ (2010) ABA J 50.
105 In this connection, Biblical scholars may also recollect the parable of wheat and the tares in Matthew’s
gospel, ch 13, where a farmer must intervene to stop hired hands from uprooting wheat along with the weeds.
106 See William W Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’ (2010) 1 J Int’l Disp Settlement 25. For a comparative
approach to the search for truth in arbitration, see Laurence Shore, ‘Arbitration, Rhetoric, Proof: The Unity of
International Arbitration Across Cultures’ in Arthur W. Rovin (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2009 (Martinus Nijhoff 2010).
107 See eg Niccolò Raselli (a judge at the Swiss Federal Supreme Court), Sachverhaltserkenntnis und Wahrheit;
Rechtsanwendung und Gerechtigkeit, in 2008 Zeitschrift für juristische Weiterbildung und Praxis, Heft 3/08,
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Admittedly, not many business managers or government administrators beat
the drum for bad case management or expensive proceedings. Yet even fewer
get excited about losing a big case they should have won based on a fair
assessment of the law and the facts.108
Without suggesting that the grumbling amounts to professional pandering,
one might question the amount of good, which comes from grieving for a lost
era of quick and cheerful decision-making. The potential harm lies not in
seeking innovative ways of deciding complex economic disputes, but in a
general disparagement of modern arbitration that diverts attention from hard
choices about procedural dilemmas, many of which implicate finely balanced
cost and benefits.
Nothing prevents litigants from giving decision-makers the power to decide
in amiable composition or ex aequo et bono, thereby dispensing with the need for
findings of fact and law. They might even confer the power to flip a coin. The
problem arises when they refuse to do so, giving every indication that they want
proceedings with full due process leading to a reasoned award based on an
accurate view of what happened combined with rigorous legal analysis.
(ii) The interaction of accuracy, fairness and efficiency
Although a fair search for truth, requiring time and expense, may appear as the
enemy of efficiency, the goals of fairness, accuracy and efficiency may
ultimately run together in the same harness. Justice too long delayed becomes
justice denied. Thus fairness requires some measure of efficiency. Likewise,
without fairness an arbitral proceeding would hardly be efficient in the sense of
delivering the desired product, which includes a reasonably correct result
combined with a sense that the process has been just. Finally, a procedurally
deficient award, even if reached in record time, would carry an inherent
inefficiency by inviting time-consuming judicial challenge.
To take a culinary analogy, a chef might fail either by making customers wait
too long for their meal, or by rapid service of a dish they never ordered.
Stämpfli Verlag AG Bern, 67–75. Dr Rasellli seems to contrast ‘materielle Wahrheit’ (what actually happened)
and ‘formelle Wahrheit’ (what the parties proffered by evidence). See also Nathalie Voser, ‘Document Production
in International Arbitration: What Does It Have to Do with Discovery?’ (2009) 3 World Arb Med Rev 481.
Dr Voser states, ‘[A]ccording to my civil law background, which is based on inquisitorial traditions, determining
the truth has never been my understanding as to the main purpose of a court proceeding. Rather, there is the
German saying ‘‘Recht hat wer Recht beweisen kann,’’ which means, ‘‘the party who can prove that it is right is
right.’’ In other words, the party who holds the evidence to prove its case will win the case’. She continues that if
the case cannot be proven with evidence available, then it is ‘just tough luck’. ibid 488.
108 To test the hypothesis that speed is what litigants really want, one might imagine management
contemplating breach of a joint venture in the following circumstances. The in-house lawyer tells her boss, ‘We
have a good case on the law and the facts.’ Moreover, she says, board minutes of the joint venture entity (now
controlled by the other side) will prove manipulation of that company’s trading and permit recovery. When the
claim is filed, the proceedings go forward with great speed. The tribunal denies pre-trial information exchange
(and the joint venture’s minute book remains with the breaching party) on the basis that document production is
a waste. The claim is denied, and all parties are wished good fortune in the future. The company gets an end to
hostilities at low cost.
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Whether in dining or in arbitration, an experience may be quick and cheap and
yet fail to deliver what was expected.
In evaluating the trade-offs in this area, many of us stumble by reacting
against our last bad experience, forgetting the specters of other unattractive
alternatives. A business manager who emerged victorious in an arbitral
proceeding may lament the very existence of judicial review, even if to hear
challenges based on alleged procedural defects. Had that same manager lost
the case, disappointment would likely have been aimed at the unavailability of
full appeal on the legal and factual merits.109
(iii) Common sense and compromise
If arbitrators faced only questions with obvious answers, proceedings would go
quickly, with little need to hear argument and evidence on matters of substance
or procedure. Reality, however, often presents shades of gray.
In this connection, pre-hearing information exchange presents a classic
battleground in critiques of arbitral efficiency.110 Producing documents
implicates time, money and energy. However, losing the case by reason of
not getting a key exhibit can be much worse. Some business managers chafe
that victory escaped them because the arbitrator refused to order production of
critical evidence. Others fulminate against the burden of having to scour files
for odd pieces of paper. The arbitrator’s dilemma, of course, lies in the fact
that decisions about relevancy and materiality must be made before the case is
fully understood.
In balancing a search for a right answer against sensitivity on time and cost,
hard choices must be made from the very start of the arbitration. In a system
where party appointment of arbitrators remains the norm, selecting the right
tribunal requires considerable input of time and effort. Yet losing the case due
to a bad tribunal is not an attractive alternative.111
The process of choosing the tribunal also can implicate competing goals.
The profile of an ideal arbitrator might be described as someone knowledge-
able in the substantive field, able to write awards in the relevant language, free
of any nationality restrictions, and experienced in conducting complex
proceedings. To this laundry list, a claimant might add availability for hearings
in the not too distant future. Yet someone who meets the bill with respect to
109 In international commerce and investment, another blind spot derives from lack of any standard against
which to compare arbitral procedures. What seems excessive document production to a Paris lawyer, accustomed
to French court practices, may appear as woefully inadequate to the New York attorney who would shoot first
and aim later under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
110 For one observer’s expression of concern about arbitral efficiency in the context of ‘uncontrolled
discovery’, see William K Slate II, ‘Addressing Speed and Cost’ (2011) 65 Dispute Resolution J 1. One might
question whether ‘uncontrolled’ is the right word for document production in international arbitration, given the
restrictions imposed by the AAA Protocols on Information Exchange and the IBA Rules of Evidence.
111 As ‘location, location, location’ constitute the three keys to real estate value, so ‘arbitrator, arbitrator,
arbitrator’ endure as the most critical factors in the integrity of any arbitration.
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experience and qualifications may have commitments that interfere with early
hearings.112
Challenges for arbitrator bias can also prove disruptive to timetables. Even
less attractive, however, would be a system with no mechanism to monitor the
arbitrator’s impartiality and independence. Until a challenge has actually been
heard, it will not be known whether allegations of bias are valid or simply
represent procedural sabotage.
One might also explore the following half dozen specific questions, which arise
after the start of proceedings. Each resists facile analysis and blanket responses,
with the efficiency-promoting decision depending on the nature of the case.
Bifurcation: Deciding jurisdiction as a preliminary issue adds times and cost.
Even less satisfactory would be a system that forces a respondent in all events
to present evidence and argument on the merits of a dispute before
arbitrators who clearly lack authority.113
Consolidation: Even outside the context of class actions, motions made to
consolidate claims and proceedings takes time to hear. It would be more
problematic to ignore the parties’ agreement on the matter, particularly if
consolidated hearings would permit cost savings.
Applicable law: Deciding the applicable law takes time. Having an award
vacated for refusal to apply the parties’ agreement, or otherwise applicable
mandatory norms, however, may be even worse.
Summary judgment: Listening to arguments about whether the tribunal
should dispose of a case on summary judgment adds time. Equally
unsatisfactory would be a requirement of evidentiary hearings in the absence
of any genuine issue of contested fact.
Damages: Determining the value of an expropriated company or a lost
business opportunity usually calls for sophisticated economic analysis, with
written and oral testimony, using time and money. Calculating damages
without the help of experts, however, would often be little more than guess
work, hardly worthy of an arbitrator who was expected to direct payment of
the proper quantum.
Reasoned awards: It takes time to write awards explaining the decision,
particularly when three arbitrators disagree on the reasoning. It can be even
more unsettling, however, to receive a decision without explanation, or with
a minority dissent pointing to flaws that might have been resolved in
good-faith deliberations.
112 Although fashionable to blame the presiding arbitrator for difficulty in finding dates or setting speedy
timetables, it remains uncontroverted that at least five different schedules must usually be accommodated: each
of three arbitrators and the legal teams for claimant and respondent. In international cases, variant vacation
practices come into play. Scandinavian companies shut down in July. New Zealanders take holiday in January.
Asking the French to work during August triggers protests about violation of international human rights
standards.
113 The relative costs and benefits of bifurcation vary according to the facts of each case, with much
depending on whether the alleged jurisdictional defect remains so intertwined with the substantive merits of the
case so as to make a separate hearing duplicative.
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An arbitrator addressing these matters will usually find that the search for truth
operates in tandem with procedural fairness, but at the expense of adding time
and cost. The quickest and cheapest way to decide a case would be simply not
to listen to the parties. Such a path, however, would hardly be consistent with
the litigants’ shared ex ante expectations when they agreed to arbitrate. Some
reasonable middle ground must be found.
Absent the parties’ agreement otherwise, the arbitrator’s mission includes
consideration of evidence and analytic argument, not gazing into a crystal ball.
In making hard choices, compromise and common sense, not dogma or
ideology, remain the touchstone for reaching toward an appropriate counter-
poise among accuracy, fairness, efficiency and enforceability.
E. Vacated Awards
The emerging significance of procedural standards does not, of course, mean
that all ‘hard law’ questions have been settled. The matter of what to do with
vacated awards remains one such unresolved aspect of arbitration’s legal
framework.
If an award rendered in Geneva is set aside in Switzerland, should it (can it)
be given effect against assets in Paris, London or Washington? Different courts
take varying positions. Although the French have no difficulty enforcing
annulled awards, American and British have tended to say, ‘Not so fast’.
The subject retains considerable sex appeal, continuing to provoke controversy
among scholars and practitioners. Some eminent writers suggest a free-floating
autonomous legal order for arbitration (un ordre juridique arbitral) distinct from
any national legal orders.114 Others are more skeptical on that score.115
The matter was revisited in lively debate about a Dutch court decision
granting enforcement of four arbitral awards that had been annulled in Russia,
all arising from the much publicized Yukos controversies.116 Some scholars
express sympathy with enforcement of vacated awards, at least if the annulment
was for a ‘local’ standard.117 Others argue that the Dutch case was wrongly
decided because an arbitral award has no existence after annulment.118
114 The theme is further explored in Emmanuel Gaillard, Aspects philosophiques du droit de l’arbi-
trage international (2008); English version published as Legal Theory of International Arbitration (2010).
See also Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘The Representations of International Arbitration’ (2010) 1 J Int’l Disp Settlement
271.
115 See eg Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Annulled Awards?’ (1998) 9 ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull 16.
116 Yukos Capital Sarl v OAO Rosneft, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam (Enterprise Division), 28 April 2009,
LJN BI2451 s 3.10. The case implicated loan agreements between Yukos Capital as lender and OJSC
Yuganskneftgas as borrower concluded at the time when both Yukos Capital and Yuganskneftgas were part of the
Yukos group. The underlying dispute derived from a Russian oil company once controlled by Russian oligarch
Mikhail Khodorkovsky until imprisoned after a bankruptcy and tax assessment, which some commentators
suggest was manufactured for political reasons.
117 See eg Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment (LSA)’
(1998) 9 ICC Bull 14.
118 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia, Case Comment on Court
of Appeal of Amsterdam April 28, 2009’ (2010) 27 J Int’l Arb 189.
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Each side of the debate seems to invoke the same regard for party intent. If
litigants agree to remove a dispute from the courts, why defer to a judicial
annulment? On the other hand, the parties often agree to arbitration not in the
abstract, but in a specific geographical venue. Thus the prospect of annulment
at the arbitral seat forms part of the bargain.
A middle position suggests that the soundest policy lies in treating
annulment decisions like other foreign money judgments. The annulment
should be respected except when reason exists to think that the judgment
vacating the award lacked procedural integrity.119 First put forward a dozen
years ago,120 this intermediate position has so far received little attention
among arbitration aficionados, perhaps due to lack of entertainment value as
compared with more extreme alternatives. At least one author, however, takes
the view that the Amsterdam court in the Yukos case adopted this position.121
Moreover, the American Law Institute now advances a similar approach,
suggesting in commentary that set-aside awards may be recognized where there
are ‘justifiable doubts about the integrity or independence of the set-aside court
with respect to the judgment in question’.122
7. Conclusion: Why Maturity Matters
Arbitrators are individuals to whom others entrust their wealth and welfare,
often in an international context when neither side wants to end up in the
other’s home court. By providing a relatively neutral adjudicatory mechanism,
arbitration promotes the type of commercial and investment reliability that
strengthens cross-border economic cooperation. Without a trustworthy arbitral
process, many transactions will either remain unconsummated or be concluded
at higher costs to reflect the absence of an adequate way to vindicate rights.
The continued appeal of arbitration, however, depends in large measure on
finding a delicate balance among accuracy, fairness and efficiency, while at the
same time providing confidence in award enforceability.
119 For an illustration of an annulment lacking procedural integrity, one might point to the underlying South
African case implicated by the enforcement proceedings in Telecordia Tech Inc v Telkom SA Ltd, 458 F 3d 172 (3d
Cir 2006). An award in an ICC arbitration, rendered in South Africa against a South African company, had been
vacated by a South African judge who refused to allow the ICC to appoint a new and neutral tribunal. Instead,
the vacating judge constituted a new arbitral tribunal composed of three retired South African judges nominated
by the losing South African party.
120 William W Park, ‘Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration’ (1999) 93 Am J Int’l L 805.
121 Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, Yukos v Rosneft: The Dutch Courts find that Exceptional Circumstances Exist, (2010)
<www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com>.
122 ALI Restatement (Third) of the US Law of International Commercial Arbitration, ss 5–12 Tentative
Draft, September 2010. Comment ‘d’ provides, ‘In extraordinary circumstance, an award that has been set aside
may also be recognized or enforced . . .when it is shown that the set-aside court knowingly and egregiously
departed from the rules governing the set-aside in that jurisdiction [or] substantial and justifiable doubts [exist]
about the integrity or independence of the rendering court with respect to the judgment in question.’
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No easy fix can be expected in the search for a process, which is reliable and
just, as well as quick and cheap. Yet the quest for balance continues even if a
perfect equilibrium remains elusive.
The needed spirit of diligence might be illustrated by an incident two
hundred thirty years ago on a day when the skies over New England turned
inky black right in the middle of the day. Historians differ on its cause, whether
a solar eclipse or a volcanic eruption. The people of that time, however, feared
the dramatic darkness as a sign that the Day of Judgment had arrived. Some
legislators at the Connecticut General Assembly proposed adjournment.
One man refused to follow the general panic. Colonel Abraham Davenport,
a devout Puritan, admitted he did not know whether or not the world was
about to end. He reasoned, however, that only two possibilities presented
themselves. If the end of the world had not come, there was no need to close
debate. In the alternative, if the Day of Judgment was in fact at hand, then
Colonel Davenport wanted his Creator, the Lord Almighty, to find him faithful
at his post. So he proposed that someone fetch candles, to bring more light
that work might continue. The speech carried the Assembly.
That same aspiration, to bring more light that work may continue,
commends itself to the study of arbitration today, just as it did to civic life
two centuries ago. That ambition advances through lively debate and dedicated
scholarship, fostered by the worldwide arbitral community. Step by step,
international dispute resolution thus moves forward to an abundant harvest.
Arbitration in Autumn 29
JNLIDS Vol2 No2 Sept 2011 05636595.indd   31 10/8/11   08:10:57
JNLIDS Vol2 No2 Sept 2011 05636595.indd   32 10/8/11   08:10:58
JNLIDS Vol2 No2 Sept 2011 05636595.indd   33 10/8/11   08:10:58
JNLIDS Vol2 No2 Sept 2011 05636595.indd   34 10/8/11   08:10:58





JNLIDS Vol2 No2 Sept 2011 05636595.indd   36 10/8/11   08:10:58
